This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy makes the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small …rms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either increase or decrease their inclusiveness. Highly inelastic market demand is su¢ cient for the presence of a competition authority to cause the least inclusive stable cartels to increase in size.
Introduction
Research has extensively explored how competition policy a¤ects whether collusion is stable and, when it is stable, the price set by cartel members and the cartel's duration. For example, there is a large and growing literature that examines the impact of corporate leniency programs on whether a cartel forms and what price it sets if it does form. 1 All that analysis, however, has made two restrictive assumptions about the cartel's composition. First, that the cartel is all-inclusive. Second, that the inclusiveness of the cartel is …xed with regards to competition policy. Practice runs contrary to the …rst assumption in that many cartels comprise some, but not all, …rms in a market 2 and, with regards to the second assumption, it is natural to expect that a tougher competition policy could in ‡uence which …rms choose to join a cartel and how inclusive a cartel must be for the cartel to be stable.
The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of competition policy on a cartel's size and composition. In earlier work (Bos and Harrington, 2010) , the set of stable cartels was characterized but in the absence of antitrust enforcement. In this paper, that model is amended to allow for a competition authority that can detect and convict cartels and, as a consequence, impose …nancial penalties and cause the cartel to shutdown. We also allow for a corporate leniency program so that a cartel member can receive a reduced penalty in exchange for cooperating with the authorities.
Our main …ndings are, for the most part, based on assessing the impact of introducing a competition authority; that is, comparing the set of stable cartels with antitrust enforcement with the set of stable cartels without antitrust enforcement. First, we …nd that competition policy results in the most inclusive stable cartel being less inclusive. In particular, small …rms are no longer cartel members when there are competition laws and an authority to enforce them. Second, more severe penalties cause the size of the most pro…table cartel to shrink which again suggests that competition policy is making for less inclusive cartels. Third, antitrust enforcement has an ambiguous e¤ect on the size of the least inclusive stable cartels. If market demand is highly inelastic then the least inclusive stable cartels encompass more …rms, but there are other market conditions such that the least inclusive stable cartels involve fewer …rms. Combining these results, we …nd that either antitrust enforcement reduces the range of sizes of stable cartels -as it increases the size of the smallest cartels and decreases the size of the largest cartels -or it shifts the range of stable cartels down -making the most and least inclusive cartels less encompassing.
In the next section, the model is introduced. Section 3 establishes equilibrium cartel behavior, while Section 4 provides the conditions for a cartel to be stable. The main results of the paper are in Section 5 which characterizes the impact of antitrust enforcement on the set of stable cartels. Section 6 concludes.
Model
To explore the impact of competition policy on the inclusiveness of cartels, the capacity-constrained price-setting repeated game in Bos and Harrington (2010) is modi…ed to allow for a cartel to be convicted and penalized. Consider an industry with n 3 …rms producing a homogeneous good at common marginal cost c 0. 3 Let N f1; : : : ; ng denote the set of …rms. Firm i has a …xed production capacity k i and, without loss of generality, assume k 1 k 2 k n . Firms have a common discount factor 2 (0; 1). The setting is one of perfect monitoring so, in any period, all past prices are common knowledge.
Market demand is given by D (p) which is a twice continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing function of price. Moreover, D (c) > 0 and monopoly pro…t, (p c) D (p), is strictly concave. The monopoly price p m is de…ned by: D (p m )+(p m c) D 0 (p m ) = 0. In each period, …rms simultaneously choose prices from f0; "; : : : ; c "; c; c + "; : : :g and produce to meet demand up to capacity. Results will be derived for " > 0 and su¢ ciently small. 4 Demand of …rm i is denoted D i (p i ; p i ), which depends on its own price p i and the vector of rivals'prices, p i . As in Bos and Harrington (2010) , three fairly general assumptions are made on …rm demand and capacities. In stating these assumptions, let (p) fj : p j = pgdenote the set of …rms that price at p and de…ne p min i min fp 1 ; : : : ; p i 1 ; p i+1 ; : : : ; p n g :
A3 k i < D (p m ) and P j6 =i k j D (c) ; 8i 2 N:
A1 holds for any well-behaved residual demand function, while A2 imposes some symmetry across …rms. The …rst part of A3 imposes an upper bound on …rm size. It has the implication that, for prices not exceeding the monopoly price, a …rm that charges a price below all of its rivals is capacity-constrained. The second part of A3 states that any n 1 …rms have su¢ cient production capacity to meet competitive demand. This assumption ensures that the one-shot game has two symmetric Nash equilibria with prices of c and c + ". Thus, for su¢ ciently small ", static Nash equilibrium pro…t is approximately zero.
Firms can potentially enhance their pro…ts through the formation of a price-…xing cartel. Consider a cartel N with common cartel price p > c + ". If N , then the cartel faces competition from at least one outsider. 5 As proven in Lemma 2 in Bos and Harrington (2010), non-colluding …rms optimally set their prices slightly below the cartel price and produce up to capacity. Residual cartel demand is then given by D (p) (K K ), where K = P i2N k i and K = P i2 k i denote, respectively, industry and cartel capacity. Clearly, collusion is bene…cial only when the cartel faces positive demand, which requires D (p) (K K ) > 0 or K > K D (p). Thus, a necessary condition for a cartel to be successful is that it controls a su¢ ciently large part of industry capacity. Under the assumption that cartel pro…t is allocated in proportion to capacity, pro…t of …rm i 2 is: 6
Firms that take part in a cartel become subject to antitrust enforcement. In each period in which at least one …rm sets the collusive price, the antitrust authority discovers cartel with probability ( ) 2 [0; 1]. Thus, ( ) maps from the set of subsets of N with at least two members into [0; 1] : The absence of antitrust enforcement is when ( ) = 0. In the event of an investigation, conviction occurs for sure and results in the immediate and permanent break-down of the cartel; hence, …rms return to a 4 While there is no explicit reference made to " in the results of this paper, we draw upon results in Bos and Harrington (2010) which presume " is su¢ ciently small. 5 refers to strict set inclusion so that 0 00 means 0 is a strict subset of 00 . 6 A motivation and extensive discussion of this assumption is provided in Bos and Harrington (2010) .
static Nash equilibrium forever. With probability 1 ( ) there is no investigation (and thus no chance of conviction) in the current period. Though …rms outside of the cartel bene…t from the higher prices -indeed, they price just below the collusive price -it is customary for them to be innocent of violating the law, and are typically not liable for customer damages. It is then assumed that they are not subject to penalties though will be harmed with the subsequent fall in prices due to antitrust enforcement shutting down the cartel.
As stated in A4, cartels with more members are assumed to have a higher probability of investigation and conviction.
Thus, the probability of being caught is higher when a cartel adds …rms, which strikes us as a natural assumption. The chances that the competition authority receives a complaint by a buyer is more likely when more buyers are a¤ected which is the case when the cartel is more inclusive. If discovery comes from a cartel member inadvertently revealing information to an uninvolved employee within the …rm then again this is more likely when more people are engaged in collusion which is true when there are more …rms in the cartel. 7 A4 also assumes the increase in probability from adding a …rm to the cartel is bounded above zero even if the additional cartel member is arbitrarily small in terms of capacity (and, as a result, market share). This condition seems reasonable given that much of the reason why more members makes detection more likely is that there are more people with knowledge of the cartel and thus more opportunities for information to leak out, which is non-trivial even when a …rm is very small. 8 In case of discovery, a cartel member faces an antitrust penalty that is proportional to the pro…t it earned while colluding:
where > 0 is a penalty multiplier. 9 Thus, larger cartel members face a larger penalty, all else equal. Many jurisdictions have a leniency program that gives cartel participants the opportunity to turn themselves in in exchange for a reduction of their penalty. To encompass such a program, assume that if …rm i is the …rst …rm to 7 One e¤ect which may work in the other direction is that non-cartel members may provide a benchmark for determining that there is a cartel. Thus, an all-inclusive cartel could possibly be more di¢ cult to detect.
8 A4 also allows the probability of discovery and conviction to depend on the capacities of the cartel members though that is not a property that is used for any of our results. What the probability is not allowed to depend on are the prices and quantities. To our knowledge, the only dynamic model in which the cartel's price behavior a¤ects the likelihood of the cartel paying penalties is Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 . 9 This is a natural speci…cation in jurisdictions that have customer damages. While customer damages are typically calculated in such a way that damages do not generally equal the incremental pro…t from collusion, incremental pro…ts are still a good approximation. In jurisdictions where the primary penalty is government …nes then this speci…cation is more problematic because those …nes are often based more on revenue than on pro…t.
receive leniency then it pays a penalty equal to the expression in (1) multiplied by 2 [0; 1]. is a policy parameter and includes the case of no leniency ( = 1) and full leniency ( = 0). Of course, in response to an investigation, all cartel members may simultaneously race for leniency in which case it is natural to suppose that each has an equal chance of receiving it. If leniency is given only to one …rm then a …rm can expect to pay the full penalty multiplied by j j 1+ j j
; each cartel member has probability 1 j j of receiving leniency and probability j j 1 j j of not receiving leniency and paying the full penalty. To allow for such discounts -as well as other programs that may impact the penalties actually paid -it is assumed that, in response to an investigation, a cartel member can expect to pay a penalty equal to (1) multiplied by ( ) 2 (0; 1]. Hence, the expected penalty that …rm i 2 faces prior to learning whether or not there is an investigation is 10
It is assumed ( ) is weakly larger for cartels encompassing more members.
The special case of ( ) = j j 1+ j j obviously satis…es these conditions. 11 
Cartel' s Objective and Equilibrium Price
Consider a cartel with a common cartel price p > c + ". The collusive value for member i 2 , denoted V i (p; ), is de…ned recursively by
1 0 While the expression in (2) suggests that ( ) is redundant because only ( ) ( ) enters, we will soon present expressions that depend only on ( ). For example, the expected payo¤ to a non-cartel member depends only on the probability of the cartel shutting down, ( ), because it is not penalized. 1 1 One might ask why leniency would be given in response to an investigation when conviction is assumed to occur for sure. One reason is that it saves on resources in prosecuting the case. Alternatively, we could specify ( ) as the probability of an investigation and introduce ! as the probability of conviction when there is no leniency program; in that case, ( ) ! is the probability of paying penalties. When there is a leniency program (and presuming that, in response to an investigation, …rms use it), ( ) can then be interpreted as the probability of paying penalties multiplied by the fraction of penalties one must pay. Discounts due to leniency would tend to reduce ( ) -which is referred to as the Cartel Amnesty e¤ect in Harrington (2008) -and if conviction is more likely because …rms come forward to cooperate then it would tend to cause ( ) > ! -which is referred to as the Race to the Courthouse e¤ect in Harrington (2008) .
Solving it for V i (p; ) yields
Observe that …rm i's value equals a common value per unit of capacity, V (p; ), multiplied by its capacity: V i (p; ) = k i V (p; ). When the cartel is not all-inclusive, non-cartel members optimally set their prices slightly below the cartel price and produce up to their capacity. Since k i < D (p m ) 8i 2 N (Assumption 3), this implies that a member that undercuts the collusive price optimally prices at p " or p 2". Speci…cally, it will choose p " when it is capacity constrained at that price; otherwise it sets p 2". As to the latter, the cheating …rm would be charging the lowest price in the industry and is therefore capacity constrained by assumption. Consequently, cutting price further would be unpro…table. Thus, for " su¢ ciently small, a cheating …rm i 2 earns approximately (p c) k i in terms of current pro…t and zero future pro…t (as all …rms revert to static Nash equilibrium pricing). 12 Finally, recall that there is still a chance of being caught in the period of defection so that cheating members remain subject to antitrust enforcement. A deviating …rm therefore also has the possibility to simultaneously apply for leniency. 13 Given a cartel , the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for …rm i 2 is then
Rearranging, the ICC can be presented as
Note that the ICC is the same for all cartel members. Whether a cheating …rm …nds it optimal to apply for leniency depends on the values of ( ) ( ) and . A deviating member …nds it optimal to turn itself in (prior to any investigation) only when leniency is su¢ ciently generous ( < ( ) ( )) and otherwise prefers not to self-report ( > ( ) ( )). 14 The cartel's problem is to choose price to maximize cartel value per unit of capacity subject to the ICC: 1 2 We conjecture that all results extend to when the cartel can be recreated in the future. For example, if the cartel comes back together in T periods then
which is qualitatively similar to (3). 1 3 This is referred to as the Deviator Amnesty e¤ect in Harrington (2008) . 1 4 Note that it is assumed a deviating …rm pays a penalty proportional to its pro…t if it set the p ( ) = arg max
Let b p ( ) be the maximum price that satis…es the ICC:
Hence, …rms can only sustain a price above cost when
This condition is guaranteed to hold when ( ) ! 0 and ! 1, provided that a su¢ cient amount of industry capacity is under the control of the cartel. Since the objective function is strictly concave,
the …rst-order condition is su¢ cient to determine the non-binding solution. Let p o ( ) denote the unconstrained optimal cartel price:
Observe that the unconstrained solution is independent of antitrust enforcement. Finally, since V (p; ) is strictly concave in p, it follows that
The equilibrium collusive value for a cartel is then
(6) Prior to exploring the impact of antitrust enforcement on the inclusiveness of cartels, it is useful to gain some insight into its impact on the collusive price. In our previous work, the optimal cartel price was primarily determined by the amount collusive price. If deviation occurred in the …rst period of collusion, it would seem more reasonable to assume that it is proportional to the pro…t it received while deviating. If deviation occurred after many periods of collusion then the penalty ought to be proportional to average pro…t during the time of the cartel which will be a weighted average of collusive pro…t (for the many periods of collusion) and deviation pro…t (for the one period of deviation) which will be close to collusive pro…t. We chose the latter speci…cation since it describes the steady-state. However, we have no reason to think that our main results are sensitive to this assumption. of industry capacity controlled by the cartel, and the cartel price was shown to be increasing in cartel capacity (Theorem 3 in Bos and Harrington, 2010). In the current analysis, …rms that take part in the collusive agreement incur expected penalties due to antitrust enforcement. The presence of antitrust enforcement potentially creates a trade-o¤ when it comes to the e¤ect of a more inclusive cartel on price. While a more inclusive cartel means less capacity is outside of the cartel, which tends to raise the collusive price, it also means higher expected penalties because the probability of discovery and conviction is higher ( is higher) and a …rm is less likely to receive leniency ( is higher), which tends to lower the collusive price. With these two counter-acting forces of a more inclusive cartel, its impact on price is ambiguous. However, pertinent to the ensuing analysis, we can show that more intense antitrust enforcement will tend to reduce the optimal cartel price by tightening the ICC. Thus, for a given cartel, a stricter antitrust regime leads to a weakly lower cartel price.
Proof. If the ICC is not binding, then p ( ) is independent of ( ) ; ( ), and . If the ICC is binding, then p ( ) satis…es
where
Given that ( ) is decreasing in ( ) ; ( ), and ; then, at higher values for those parameters, (7) implies
It follows that p ( ) must decline so that D (p ( )) is increased and
is decreased in order to satisfy the ICC.
Consistent with other work, more intense antitrust enforcement (weakly) reduces the cartel price, holding the composition of the cartel …xed. Previous research typically assumes the cartel is all-inclusive and is unresponsive to antitrust enforcement (with the exception of when enforcement is increased so much that collusion is no longer sustainable). The remainder of the analysis of this paper will explore how antitrust enforcement a¤ects how inclusive is the cartel.
De…ning the Set of Stable Cartels
Let us now direct our attention to cartel formation and identifying what coalition con…gurations are stable. d 'Aspremont et al (1983) were among the …rst to provide a clear and intuitive notion of cartel stability. A cartel is considered to be stable when (i) none of its members wants to leave the cartel (internal stability) and (ii) none of the non-cartel members wants to join the cartel (external stability).
To derive the exact conditions in our model for a cartel to be both internally and externally stable, consider some candidate cartel . The equilibrium value to …rm i is k i V ( ) when i 2 and is
De…ne W i ( ) to be the equilibrium value to …rm i when i 2 and it does not join the cartel, and when i = 2 and it joins the cartel. W i ( ) is then the payo¤ that …rm i expects if it acts contrary to expectations about cartel membership, whether it means not joining the cartel when it should have or joining the cartel when it should not have. 15 With these equilibrium values, a cartel is stable when all cartel members strictly prefer to be a member (internal stability) and all non-members weakly prefer not to be a member (external stability). Internal stability requires a strict preference for cartel membership in order to rule out the trivial case in which …rms are members of a cartel but the cartel prices the same as when there is no cartel (that is, at cost). 16
In specifying W i ( ) ; it is standard in the literature (including our earlier paper) to assume that, regardless of …rms'decisions as to whether or not to join the cartel, the resulting cartel acts according to the equilibrium yielding the highest collusive value. While that is a natural speci…cation when …rms act according to expectations with respect to the cartel membership decision, there could be other reasonable responses when …rms do not act according to expectations, either by not joining a cartel for which it was supposed to be a member or joining a cartel for which it was not supposed to be a member. A novel feature of our approach is to consider various equilibria in response to such events. One equilibrium is the standard speci…cation: the cartel accommodates the disequilibrium membership decision by achieving the maximal level of collusion given whichever …rms are in the cartel. We refer to this as the accommodative equilibrium and it implies:
;
An alternative equilibrium is that the cartel responds in a punishing manner by disbanding so that all …rms receive the static Nash equilibrium payo¤. Referring to it as the aggressive equilibrium, W i ( ) = 0 8i. There are other equilibria one could consider.
In performing an equilibrium selection, we are guided by the objective of this paper which is to assess the e¤ect of antitrust enforcement on the range of stable cartels. Hence, we will consider the most expansive set of cartels. Given that the aggressive equilibrium is the equilibrium with the lowest payo¤s, if a cartel is not stable with the aggressive equilibrium then it is not stable with any other equilibrium. This then argues to specifying the aggressive equilibrium. However, one modi…cation to that speci…cation is appropriate on plausibility grounds. It would seem nonsensical for a cartel to punish a cartel member for departing or a non-cartel member for joining when such an action actually improves the payo¤s of cartel members. Thus, when entry into (exit from) the cartel enhances the value of the original (remaining) members of the cartel, it is assumed that the accommodative equilibrium ensues. This assumption is embodied in the following two conditions used in evaluating the stability of cartel . First,
that is, if an outsider joining the cartel raises each original cartel member's payo¤ under the supposition of the accommodative equilibrium then cartel members do in fact respond with the accommodative equilibrium. Second,
that is, if an insider leaving the cartel raises each remaining cartel member's payo¤ under the supposition of the accommodative equilibrium then cartel members do in fact respond with the accommodative equilibrium. For all other cases, cartel members respond with the aggressive equilibrium so W i ( ) = 0.
Impact of a Competition Authority on the Set of Stable Cartels
First note that if antitrust enforcement is su¢ ciently strong then no cartels are stable because collusion is ine¤ective at sustaining prices above the non-collusive price. That is not the scenario examined here. Instead, we are considering when stable cartels still exist and asking whether they tend to be larger or smaller compared to the absence of antitrust enforcement. Given that there can be many stable cartels, the analysis will focus on the impact on the range of cartel size. 17 For this purpose, we de…ne: A minimal stable cartel is a stable cartel for which there is no sub-coalition of that cartel which is stable, while a maximal stable cartel is a stable cartel for which there is no super-coalition containing that cartel which is stable. There can be multiple minimal and maximal stable cartels.
The impact of antitrust enforcement on the size of maximal stable cartels is examined in Section 5.1 and on the size of minimal stable cartels in Section 5.2. It'll be shown that competition policy can reduce the size of the largest cartels but, depending on the circumstances, can either increase or decrease the size of the smallest cartels.
Maximal Cartel Size
The task is to compare the size of maximal stable cartels with and without antitrust enforcement. As a benchmark, Lemma 5 shows that if collusion is sustainable in the absence of a competition authority -for which >
is a necessary and su¢ cient condition -then there is a unique maximal cartel and it is the all-inclusive cartel. 18
. In the absence of antitrust enforcement, the maximal stable cartel is the all-inclusive cartel.
Proof. Theorem 4 in Bos and Harrington (2010) shows that the cartel value without antitrust enforcement, V ( ); is greater when the cartel is more inclusive: if 0 00 then V ( 00 ) > V ( 0 ). Consider the all-inclusive cartel:
= N . As there are no outsiders, it is trivially externally stable. By assuming W i ( ) = 0 -that is, an insider who leaves the cartel can expect the static Nash equilibrium -it follows from V (N ) > 0 that it is internally stable. Therefore, N is stable in the absence of antitrust enforcement.
It is an immediate corollary that antitrust enforcement cannot cause the largest stable cartel to be more inclusive. Thus, the issue is whether it can cause the largest stable cartel to contract. While the all-inclusive cartel generates the highest pro…ts without antitrust enforcement, this may no longer be true with an antitrust authority because expected penalties are increasing in cartel size. While each additional member to the cartel adds value for the original cartel members by restricting its supply below its capacity, it also creates a cost to those original members by increasing the probability of discovery and conviction (and perhaps reducing the chances of an original member receiving leniency since now there will be more …rms striving for it). Given that the impact on the collusive price from a …rm joining a cartel is positively related to …rm size -a larger …rm brings more capacity under the control of the cartel which means output is restricted more and price rises more -a su¢ -ciently small …rm may not raise the collusive price enough to o¤set having increased expected penalties. As a result, a small …rm earns higher pro…t outside of the cartelwhich is the case whether or not there is antitrust enforcement -and, in addition, the remaining cartel members also earn higher pro…t when a small …rm remains outside of the cartel -which is only true when there is antitrust enforcement and is because expected penalties are lower.
Theorem 6
In the presence of antitrust enforcement, 9k > 0 such that if k n < k then a maximal stable cartel excludes …rm n:
Proof. If p (N ) = c then the theorem is true because N is not a stable cartel and thus cannot be a maximal stable cartel. Thus, for the remainder of the proof, suppose p (N ) > c so that a collusive price can be sustained with the all-inclusive cartel. Let us derive su¢ cient conditions for cartel N not to be stable.
The collusive value per unit of capacity for the all-inclusive cartel is
and recall that the value to …rm i is k i V (N ) : Let us contrast this with the collusive value per unit of capacity for the cartel that excludes …rm n. Letting N nfng then
which means a cartel member i 2 earns k i V ( ) : Comparing (9) with (8), the less than all inclusive cartel generates more value than the all-inclusive cartel when:
Rearranging yields:
Consider the LHS as k n ! 0; N ) ) which implies the LHS of (10) is at least one. Next consider the RHS of (10). Re-arranging the expression, it is strictly less than one i¤
This condition holds because of A4 and A5: lim kn!0 (N ) > lim kn!0 ( ) and (N ) ( ): We have then shown that the …rms in earn a higher payo¤ when …rm n is not a member of the cartel, compared to when it is a member. By our speci…cation, this implies that if …rm n departs from cartel N then the remaining cartel members respond with the accommodative equilibrium.
The second step is to show that …rm n prefers to depart from cartel N when the accommodative equilibrium ensues in which case N is not internally stable. Firm n's payo¤ in the cartel is
and outside of the cartel is
Given that
then (12) exceeds (11) if
In sum, as k n ! 0, cartel N is not stable because …rm n …nds it more pro…table to be outside of the cartel assuming the cartel accommodates its departure and, given the remaining cartel members are better o¤ with the departure, they do indeed accommodate it.
We then …nd that antitrust enforcement can result in less inclusive cartels because the smallest …rms may not be members. The next natural question to ask is: What is the e¤ect on price from the cartel being made less inclusive because of the presence of a competition authority? If the cartel can sustain the unconstrained collusive price then excluding smaller …rms must result in a lower price; the unconstrained collusive price is independent of antitrust enforcement and is lower when the cartel controls less capacity. However, when the collusive price is determined by the ICC, the e¤ect of a less inclusive cartel on price is unclear. O¤setting the price-reducing e¤ect of the cartel controlling less capacity, collusive value is higher which loosens the ICC and could possibly allow for a higher collusive price. Sorting out those con ‡icting forces is a topic for future research.
Thus far we've shown that maximal cartels are less inclusive in the presence of a competition authority. The basis for this result is that collusive value per unit of capacity for cartel members is maximized by excluding the smallest …rms. Building on that …nding, let us characterize how more intense enforcement -as re ‡ected in a higher penalty multiple -impacts the characteristics of the most pro…table cartel. For this purpose, de…ne an ordering of cartels: 00 0 if and only if ( 00 ) ( 0 ); ( 00 ) ( 0 ); and K 00 K 0 and one of the inequalities is strict. Thus, cartels are ranked according to the probability of paying penalties, penalty discount (which is 1 ), and capacity. Generally, less inclusive cartels will have a lower probability of paying penalties, a higher discount, and lower capacity. 19 Under the assumptions of full leniency and approximately linear demand, the next result shows that, in response to more severe penalties, the cartel that maximizes value per unit of cartel capacity is a cartel that is (weakly) "smaller" in the sense of controlling less capacity, having a lower probability of paying penalties, and having a higher discount on penalties. 20 Theorem 7 Assume = 0 and demand is approximately linear (D 00 ( ) ' 0). De…ne ( ) as the most pro…table stable cartel (in terms of value per unit of capacity). If is complete and 00 > 0 then ( ( 0 )) ( ( 00 )); ( ( 0 )) ( ( 00 )); and K ( 0 ) K ( 00 ) ; that is, in response to higher penalties, the most pro…table stable cartel has a (weakly) lower probability of paying penalties, higher discount, and lower capacity.
Proof. The proof strategy is to show that if 00 0 and V ( 0 ; 0 ) > V ( 00 ; 0 ) (where we have made explicit the value for ) then V ( 0 ; 00 ) > V ( 00 ; 00 ) where 00 > 0 : That is, if cartel 0 is more pro…table than cartel 00 and cartel 0 has a lower probability of paying penalties ( ( 00 ) ( 0 )), a higher discount ( ( 00 ) ( 0 )); and controls less capacity (K 00 K 0 ) then cartel 0 will continue to be more profitable when penalties are higher. With that result, it can then be argued that the most pro…table cartel must be "smaller" (in the sense of the ordering) when is higher. For suppose the most pro…table cartel when = 0 is ( 0 ): V ( ( 0 ) ; 0 ) > V ( ; 0 ) 8 . When is increased to 00 ; it must then still be the case that ( 0 ) is more pro…table than "larger" cartels -V ( ( 0 ) ; 00 ) > V ( ; 00 ) 8 such that ( 0 ) -which then implies that the most pro…table cartel must be (weakly) "smaller" than ( 0 ). Using the expression for V ( ) ; cartel 0 generates higher value (per unit of cartel capacity) than 00 when
Re-arranging, we have
The task is to show that if (13) holds and ( 00 ) ( 0 ); ( 00 ) ( 0 ); and K 00 K 0 then (13) continues to hold when is increased. This result will be shown for two cases. First, when the collusive price is the unconstrained cartel price: p ( ) = p o ( ) : Second, when the collusive price is the constrained cartel price, p ( ) = b p ( ) ; and there is full leniency ( = 0) and demand is approximately linear. 21 Suppose the ICC is not binding at the collusive price, in which case the collusive price p ( ) is de…ned by (5) and thus is independent of : Let us show that if (13) holds and ( 00 ) ( 0 ) ; ( 00 ) ( 0 ) ; and K 00 K 0 then it continues to hold when is increased. Since the RHS of (13) is unchanged by increasing , we need only show that raising does not decrease the LHS of (13) . Take the derivative of the LHS of (13):
Next note that:
Thus, if ( 00 ) ( 0 ) and ( 00 ) ( 0 ) then sign
Hence, when collusive prices are unconstrained, if collusive value is higher with 0 than with 00 ; and 0 involves a weakly lower probability of paying penalties, ( 00 ) ( 0 ), and a weakly higher discount on penalties, ( 00 ) ( 0 ), then collusive value is still higher with 0 than with 00 after is increased. Therefore, more severe penalties result in cartel value being maximized by a cartel with a lower probability of conviction. Now suppose collusive prices are determined by a binding ICC. p ( ) is then de…ned by:
Substituting (14) into V ( ) from (6):
It is not di¢ cult to show that V ( ) is decreasing in ; that is, more severe penalties lower the collusive value for any given cartel. However, what we want to show is: if ( 00 ) ( 0 ); ( 00 ) ( 0 ); and K 00 K 0 (and one of them holds strictly) then V ( 0 ) is less sensitive to than is V ( 00 ) : That will then imply: if V ( 0 ) > V ( 00 ) then, after is increased, it is still the case that V ( 0 ) > V ( 00 ). Take the derivative of (15) with respect to .
Re-arranging yields:
Assume a full leniency program, = 0; to simplify (16):
Thus, the change in collusive value with respect to just equals the change in collusive price with respect to : By Theorem 1, @p ( ) @ < 0 and, therefore, @V ( ) @ < 0; so higher penalties reduce collusive value.
What we then need to show is: if ( 00 ) ( 0 ); ( 00 ) ( 0 ); and K 00 K 0 (and one of them holds strictly) then V ( 0 ) is less sensitive to than is V ( 00 ) which, by (17), requires
Total di¤erentiating (14) with respect to ,
Thus,
Minimal Cartel Size
Next we turn to considering the smallest stable cartels. A cartel can be "not inclusive enough" for stability for either of two reasons. First, it may not control enough capacity to sustain any collusion; that is, the collusive price is just the static Nash equilibrium price. In that case, the cartel is not internally stable. Second, it may not be externally stable in that a non-member prefers to join because doing so su¢ ciently raises the collusive price and the rise in the new member's price-cost margin is enough to o¤set it having lower output and becoming liable for penalties. Using these two conditions, the analysis in this section shows that antitrust enforcement can either make the smallest cartels more inclusive or less inclusive.
Minimal Cartel Size Rises
The next result provides conditions whereby the smallest cartels are at least as large when there is antitrust enforcement. Speci…cally, when some cartels are unstable without antitrust enforcement then they are unstable with antitrust enforcement. Proof. Recall that, without antitrust enforcement, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a cartel to sustain a collusive price is
:
then p ( ) = c and cartel is (trivially) internally unstable. As postulated for when there is no antitrust enforcement, suppose 0 is a minimal stable cartel and p ( ) = c for all 0 which means (20) holds. We want to show that, in the presence of antitrust enforcement, the equivalent condition to (20) holds for all 0 which means the minimal stable cartel is not a subset of 0 .
With antitrust enforcement, the analogue to (20) is
To see that (20) implies (21), note that the RHS's are the same, whereas the LHS of (21) is lower. As to the latter, if ( ) ( ) , then we need
which holds. If ( ) ( ) < , then we need
which also holds. Hence, with antitrust enforcement, p ( ) = c and therefore is internally unstable for all 0 .
In establishing that minimal stable cartel size may not fall with antitrust enforcement, the previous theorem relied on p ( ) = c for all sub-coalitions of the minimal stable cartel without antitrust enforcement. We'll now show that a su¢ cient condition for that property to hold is that market demand is su¢ ciently inelastic. Recall that, without an antitrust authority, p ( ) is de…ned by:
Assume market demand is perfectly inelastic: D (p) = Q 0 for p p (with p > c) and D (p) = 0 for p > p. The above problem becomes
, and p ( ) = c when
Let us then show that if p ( ) = p then is stable which implies: if 0 is a minimal stable cartel then p ( ) = c for all
which implies internal stability when W i ( ) = 0; that is, the aggressive equilibrium ensues if a cartel member departs because such a departure reduces the collusive value for the remaining cartel members. If j = 2 then, even if the accommodative equilibrium ensues, it is externally stable because …rm j earns
outside of the cartel and earns
by joining the cartel which is strictly smaller. Intuitively, a …rm that joins the cartel goes from producing at capacity to producing below capacity. Thus, a necessary condition for it to …nd it pro…table to join a cartel is that, by bringing more capacity under the control of the cartel, the collusive price is higher. (Recall that both insiders and outsiders charge, approximately, the same price.) However, when market demand is perfectly inelastic, expanding the cartel does not raise the collusive price. By continuity, when market demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, a minimal stable cartel without a competition authority will be a least inclusive cartel that is able to sustain a collusive price, which is the condition speci…ed in Theorem 8.
Continuing with the case of perfectly inelastic demand, we can provide su¢ cient conditions for minimal cartel size to strictly expand in response to antitrust enforcement. With antitrust enforcement, the ICC with perfectly inelastic market demand takes the form:
Once again, if …rms are able to collude then the collusive price is p. Therefore, a minimal stable cartel is a least inclusive cartel that sustains p. Thus, if
then cartel 0 can e¤ectively collude in the absence of antitrust enforcement but cannot do so in the presence of antitrust enforcement. 22 Therefore, minimal stable cartel size must rise in response to antitrust enforcement (at least when the expected antitrust penalty is not increasing too much in cartel size). 23 2 2 To see how (22) may hold, suppose = 0. Given that
is true -and the RHS of the preceding inequality is the RHS of (22) when = 0 -then there exists values for (22) is true. 2 3 It is possible that there does not exist a minimal stable cartel -which is surely the case if the competition policy parameters are su¢ ciently high -but it is easy to …nd intermediate values such that these inequalities hold and there still exist more inclusive cartels that are able to collude. A general set of conditions for that to be true are available.
In sum, when market demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, a minimal stable cartel is the smallest cartel for which a collusive price can be sustained. By tightening the ICC, those cartels that could not sustain a collusive price, still cannot do so with antitrust enforcement. Hence, cartels cannot be less inclusive and, furthermore, may have to be more inclusive. Note that highly inelastic market demand may plausibly hold for cartels that sell an input to industrial buyers where the input makes up a small part of the cost of producing the industrial buyer's product. 24 In a market with highly inelastic market demand in which the cartel is minimally inclusive, it is then predicted that antitrust enforcement would cause a cartel to make itself more inclusive in order to be able to e¤ectively collude.
Minimal Cartel Size Falls
The next result presumes the condition in Theorem 8 does not hold. In that case, it is possible that antitrust enforcement reduces the size of a minimal stable cartel. Speci…cally, consider a cartel that was not externally stable in the absence of antitrust enforcement because a …rm outside of the cartel found it pro…table to join because it would signi…cantly increase the collusive price. That same cartel may now be externally stable when there is antitrust enforcement. If the addition of that …rm su¢ ciently increases the likelihood of detection then it is no longer pro…table to join. As long as the cartel can still sustain a collusive price, it is also internally stable.
Theorem 9
In the absence of antitrust enforcement , assume 0 is a minimal stable cartel and p ( 00 ) > c for some 00 0 . Then, in the presence of antitrust enforcement, there exist ( ) such that 00 is stable; hence, it is a subset of 0 that is a minimal stable cartel.
Proof. In the absence of antitrust enforcement, suppose 0 is a stable cartel, 00 is not a stable cartel where 00 0 , and p ( 00 ) > c: Note that, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, internal stability of 00 is satis…ed by specifying the aggressive equilibrium when a cartel member fails to join. Thus, if 00 is not stable, it is because it is not externally stable. Now suppose there is antitrust enforcement and let ( 00 ) = and min f ( 00 [ fjg) : j = 2 00 g = ; that is, is the smallest probability of conviction that results from an outsider joining 00 . By continuity with the case of no antitrust enforcement, if ' 0 then 00 is internally stable. By setting ' 1, 00 is externally stable because another …rm joining the cartel is unpro…table due to the high rate of conviction making it very likely the cartel will shut down. 25 An issue is what are su¢ cient conditions for the condition in Theorem 9 to hold. That is, one needs to show that, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, there exists 0 such that: 1) 0 is stable; 2) 8 0 ;
is unstable (so that 0 is a minimal stable cartel); and 3) 9 0 such that p ( ) > c: There must then be cartels that are internally stable (that is, able to sustain a collusive price) but are not externally stable because a …rm would want to join for the purpose of su¢ ciently raising price. Here we o¤er some su¢ cient conditions. Assume ' 1 so that, without antitrust enforcement, the collusive price is the unconstrained price. Assuming D(p) = 1 p, it is shown in the Appendix that cartel is internally stable (that is, p ( ) > c) if and only if K > K 1 + c; and is externally stable (that is, an outsider does not increase its pro…t by joining) if and only if
Firm j does not want to join if it is su¢ ciently small which makes sense since joining will not have much of an impact on the collusive price -given that non-cartel capacity has not fallen that much -but will have a proportionally large e¤ect on …rm j's supply. Consider cartels comprising the largest …rms: (m) f1; :::; mg ; where recall k 1 k n . There exists cartels satisfying the property in Theorem 9 if there exists h such that:
The …rst two inequalities mean that cartel (h) is the smallest cartel that is able to sustain a collusive price, and the third inequality means that the cartel is not externally stable because …rm h + 1 wants to join it.
Discussion
Based upon the preceding analysis, let us draw out some general insight regarding how the introduction of a competition authority a¤ects the set of stable cartels.
Recall that a cartel is stable when it is internally stable -which means …rms are able to sustain a collusive price and no member earns more pro…t by leaving the carteland it is externally stable -which means no outsider to the cartel would earn higher pro…t by joining the cartel. External stability requires that a …rm prefers not to join the cartel. Without antitrust enforcement, the rationale for joining is that it raises the collusive price -by bringing more capacity under the control of the cartel -but at the cost that the …rm must then constrain its supply below capacity. With antitrust enforcement, there is an additional cost of joining which is that the …rm that joins now becomes liable for penalties. Given the associated reduction in pro…t from becoming a cartel member, it would seem to make it more likely that any cartel satis…es external stability. Furthermore, adding a …rm can raise expected penalties -by, for example, making discovery of the cartel more likely -which will lower collusive value and (weakly) lower the collusive price by tightening the ICC. Thus, price may not rise as much with the addition of this …rm, compared to when there is no competition authority. As a result, cartels that were externally stable without antitrust enforcement are probably externally stable with antitrust enforcement. The impact on cartel size is then in terms of making previously (externally) unstable cartels now (externally) stable. Speci…cally, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, a relatively small cartel may have been unstable because it was externally unstable; that is, a …rm wanted to join in order to expand cartel capacity and raise the collusive price. Now that there is antitrust enforcement, the prospect of becoming liable for penalties may discourage that …rm from joining in which case that small cartel is now externally stable. In sum, it would seem that antitrust enforcement augments external stability -…rms are less inclined to join a cartel -and this may result in smaller cartels now being stable.
Turning to internal stability, it requires, …rst, that the cartel has enough capacity so that a collusive price can be sustained, and, second, that the cartel value does not rise in response to a member leaving. The latter condition implies that the remaining cartel members would accommodate the exit and, given that accommodation, the exiting …rm would earn more pro…t outside of the cartel. Based on the preceding analysis, we conjecture that the presence of a competition authority makes it less likely that a cartel will satisfy internal stability. We know that enforcement (weakly) reduces the collusive price by tightening the ICC. Thus, it could cause a cartel to lose the ability to sustain a collusive price and thus cause the cartel to be internally unstable. To successfully collude, the cartel may then need to be more inclusive in order to control more capacity (though this does depend on the rise in expected penalties from greater inclusion not being so large as to counteract that e¤ect). Hence, antitrust enforcement may result in smaller cartels becoming larger in order to sustain a collusive price. For the most inclusive cartels, antitrust enforcement may undermine internal stability for a very di¤erent reason. A …rm contributes to cartel value by having the cartel control more capacity which then allows it to raise the collusive price but, at the same time, it detracts from cartel value by increasing the probability of discovery and, more generally, raising expected penalties. Thus, antitrust enforcement could result in cartel value being enhanced by a …rm leaving the cartel (which also implies the …rm …nds it pro…table to leave) which makes the cartel internally unstable. This force means that antitrust enforcement will tend to reduce the size of large cartels. It then appears that antitrust enforcement undermines internal stability which can cause the smallest cartels to be larger and the largest cartels to be smaller. Hence, the range of stable cartels shrinks.
In sum, our analysis suggests that antitrust enforcement makes it less di¢ cult to satisfy external stability -outsiders to a cartel are more inclined not to participatebut makes it more di¢ cult to satisfy internal stability -insiders to a cartel are more inclined not to participate. As just described, these forces make for less inclusive stable cartels. However, there is an additional way in which antitrust enforcement internally destabilizes a cartel which is that it prevents the cartel from being able to sustain a collusive price. In that case, cartel stability may require a more inclusive cartel.
Concluding Remarks
This paper is an initial foray into how competition policy impacts the inclusiveness of cartels. We found that the presence of antitrust enforcement causes the most inclusive stable cartels to be less inclusive and, in particular, small …rms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, the presence of antitrust enforcement can either increase or decrease their inclusiveness, depending on market conditions. When market demand is highly inelastic, it will cause the least inclusive stable cartels to encompass more …rms in order to be able to sustain a collusive price.
A next step in this analysis is to examine the impact of competition policy on price when the size and composition of the cartel is endogenized. Previous research on how competition policy impacts price has presumed the cartel is all-inclusive and the all-inclusivity is una¤ected by competition policy. However, competition policy can have an indirect e¤ect on price through its impact on which …rms join the cartel. Our analysis suggests that such indirect e¤ects could be important. From a tractability perspective, conducting such an analysis will probably necessitate more structure than is assumed in this paper and may ultimately require numerical analysis.
Another potentially interesting extension of our analysis would be to allow cartels to use exclusionary tactics to restrain the supply of non-cartel members. The current analysis presumes that non-cartel members do not restrain their supply in that they price just below the cartel's price and produce up to capacity. This is obviously detrimental to the cartel and, in practice, some cartels have augmented their collusive price-setting with exclusionary activities intended to constrain the supply of non-cartel members. For example, in the district heating pipes cartel, the Swedish …rm Powerpipe did not join the cartel and eventually complained to the European Commission that there was a cartel and it was acting in a predatory manner against it. 26 The use of exclusionary activities also explains why non-cartel members are a common source of discovery of cartels. Hay and Kelley (1974) found that 12 out of 49 U.S. Department of Justice cases were discovered by means of a "complaint by a competitor" and was the second most common source of detection. This discussion raises two interesting issues. First, a partially inclusive cartel could be made more pro…table by engaging in exclusionary activities against non-cartel members so as to reduce non-cartel supply, but doing so runs the risk of those non-cartel members complaining and the cartel being discovered. Encompassing those factors in our model could produce some new insight into both the structure of cartels and the properties of collusive practices. Second, it identi…es a complementarity between competition laws. The law against price-…xing (Section 1 of the Sherman Ac in the U.S. and Article 101 TFEU in the EU) may be easier to enforce by virtue of the law against exclusionary practices (Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the U.S. and Article 102 TFEU in the EU). If some cartels are not all-inclusive -as the evidence and our analysis suggests is likely -then laws against exclusionary practices provide a stronger incentive for non-cartel members to complain and a weaker incentive for cartel members to engage in such activities, which will tend to make collusion less pro…table and impact the inclusiveness of cartels.
7 Appendix: Proof of Conditions for the Property in Theorem 9 to Hold
In Theorem 9, we have shown that antitrust enforcement may reduce minimal cartel size. A key requirement for this to occur is that, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, there exists some subset of a minimal cartel that is able to sustain a price above costs. If this requirement is not met, then we know by Theorem 8 that antitrust enforcement will not lead to smaller minimal cartels. This raises the issue of when without antitrust enforcement there exists a cartel such that: 1) is stable, 2) 0 is unstable for all 0 and 3) there exists a cartel 0 for which p ( 0 ) > c. In the following, we present su¢ cient conditions for this property to hold.
Step 1: Derive conditions under which a cartel is stable.
To begin, assume that D(p) = 1 p and ' 1. Thus, for a given cartel , the ICC is not binding. In this case, the optimal cartel price is given by
For to be internally stable through the aggressive equilibrium it must hold that p ( ) > c, which requires
This cartel is externally stable when none of the outsiders …nds it pro…table to join, which is the case when
By using
the external stability condition reduces to
Substituting p ( ) = which implies K > K 1 + c. We therefore conclude that a cartel is stable when the following condition holds:
Step 2: Derive conditions under which the cartel is minimally stable.
Let us now show when 0 is unstable for all 0 . Towards that end, consider cartels that involve the largest …rms: (m) f1; :::; mg and de…ne h by
Thus, p ( (h)) > c and p ( (m)) = c, 8m < h: Cartel (h) is therefore the smallest cartel for which a price above cost is sustainable. Observe that there always exists a h for which this condition is satis…ed since for h = 2 we have k 1 K 1 + c, which holds by assumption and for h = n we have K 1 + c < k 1 + + k n , 1 c > 0, which again holds by assumption.
Next, suppose there exists r satisfying:
and q k 2 r+1 + (K 1 + c)
We show below that such an r exists and is unique. Now consider a cartel (m) for which m < r . Such a cartel is unstable because: 1) If m 2 fh; :::; r 1g, then it is internally stable through the aggressive equilibrium, but externally unstable as …rm m + 1 wants to join; and 2) If m 2 f2; :::; h 1g, then it is internally unstable as p ( (m)) = c. By contrast, the cartel (r) is stable because: 1) it is internally stable since k 1 + + k r q k 2 r+1 + (K 1 + c) 2 implies k 1 + + k r > K 1 + c and thus p ( (r)) > c; and 2) it is externally stable because …rm r + 1 prefers not to join. In turn, this implies that …rm s prefers not to join 8s > r + 1: That is, if …rm r + 1 does not want to join the cartel containing the r largest …rms, then all smaller …rms do not want to join either.
As a …nal step, let us show that (r) is not only stable, but also minimally stable. We know that
So, the cartel (r 1) is not externally stable. Next consider any (r). If p ( ) = c, then is not internally stable. If p ( ) > c, then it is internally stable, but not externally stable because
implies X j2 k j < q k 2 i + (K 1 + c) 2 for i = 2 and i r:
This is true, because k 1 + + k r 1 P j2 k j . Therefore, the LHS of (24) is smaller than the LHS of (23) and the RHS of (24) is weakly larger than the RHS of (23). Hence, …rm i = 2 would choose to join , which means that all (r) are unstable. The cartel (r) is therefore not only stable, but also minimally stable.
Step 3: Derive conditions under which a subset of (r) can sustain a collusive price.
What remains is to …nd m such that r > m h. That is, there are subsets of the minimal stable cartel (r) that have su¢ cient capacity to support a collusive price. For such a subset it must hold that
Note that if this condition is not satis…ed for m = h; so that q k 2 h+1 + (K 1 + c)
then it does not hold for any m > h (as the RHS is increasing in m and the LHS is non-increasing in m). Thus, the necessary and su¢ cient condition is that 9h such that:
This means that the smallest cartel that is able to sustain a collusive price (cartel (h)) needs to be externally unstable.
To conclude, let us show that r exists and is unique. De…ne r by Note that (m) is strictly increasing in m. Hence, if (1) < 0 < (n), then there exists a unique r such that: (r 1) < 0 (r). For (1) < 0, it must hold that
This inequality is satis…ed when
which is true by assumption. For (n) > 0, it must hold that
which too holds by assumption. Thus, there exists a unique r such that (r 1) < 0 (r).
